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Abstract
Relationship lending is broadly interpreted as a strong partnership between a lender and
a borrower. Nevertheless, we still lack consensus regarding how to quantify the strength of a
lending relationship, while simple statistics such as the frequency and volume of loans have been
used as proxies in previous studies. Here, we propose statistical tests to identify relationship
lending as a significant tie between banks. Application of the proposed method to the Italian
interbank networks reveals that the fraction of relationship lending among all bilateral trades
has been quite stable and that the relationship lenders tend to impose high interest rates at
the time of financial distress.
Keywords: Relationship lending, interbank markets, temporal networks
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1 Introduction
The role of a strong relationship between a lender and a borrower, the so-called relationship
lending (or relationship banking), is one of the most widely discussed issues in theoretical and
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empirical studies of banking. Many empirical studies investigate the economic impact of rela-
tionship lending on the terms of loans, such as interest rates and the amount of funds lent, aim-
ing to test the theoretical implications that have been provided since the early 1990s (Sharpe,
1990; Rajan, 1992; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In particular,
relationship lending is considered to play an important role in providing liquidity to borrowers
facing credit constraints by reducing the extent of information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers. On the other hand, borrowers in relationship trades could be “locked-in” by lenders
due to their exclusive acquisition of private information, leading to a hold-up problem (Petersen
and Rajan, 1995; Von Thadden, 2004; Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
There are also a number of studies on relationship lending in interbank markets, where
banks lend to and borrow from each other. The results of the previous analyses, however, are
based on ad-hoc and simple measures of relationship lending, and their simplicity may cause
a mismeasurement error especially when there is heterogeneity in banks’ activities. A naive
measure of relationship lending is the number of transactions between two banks conducted
during a certain period of time (Furfine, 1999; Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2017). Another widely
used measure is the degree of concentration in lending (Cocco et al., 2009; Afonso et al., 2013),
measured by the share of funds lent to a particular counterparty. These two measures are ex-
pected to straightforwardly capture the strength of a bilateral relationship in the interbank
market; a bank pair engaging in relationship lending would trade more frequently and devote
a larger share of their total trading volume to the trades between them than to trades with
other banks. However, these measures might misinterpret the strength of lending relationships.
First, the number of trades with a particular counterparty may merely reflect a bank’s need
to trade in the interbank market. For instance, if two banks have strong needs to provide
and obtain overnight liquidity in the interbank market, respectively, these banks are likely to
trade by chance even if they have no preferences for trading partners. Second, the degree of
concentration in lending can be affected by the difference in the balance-sheet size of coun-
terparties. For example, suppose that a large bank demands a greater amount of funds than
smaller banks do. If a bank lends to the large bank, the degree of concentration in lending
may appear to be large, even though the lending bank has no preference for partners. The
share of lending volume to a particular partner could correctly capture relationship lending
if all the counterparties had the same liquidity demands. Given these limitations, we need a
more carefully designed measure of relationship lending that will allow us to control for these
factors.
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In this work, we propose the concept of a significant tie as a statistically founded definition
of relationship lending. Two banks are said to be connected by a significant tie if the number
of trades between them is too large to be explained by random chance after controlling for their
intrinsic activity levels. We control for the activity of banks by employing a simple network-
generative model as the null model. The so-called fitness model, one of the standard network-
generative models in network science (Caldarelli et al., 2002; De Masi et al., 2006; Musmeci
et al., 2013), considers a situation in which the probability of two banks being matched is
given as a function of their activity parameters (i.e., fitnesses) independently of the history
of their transactions. This history-independent property enables us to explicitly compute the
theoretical distribution of the number of bilateral trades under the null hypothesis that there
is no preference for partners, thus allowing for statistical tests. In this paper, we regard a bank
pair connected by a significant tie as engaging in relationship lending. This definition would
eliminate the possible mismeasurement of relationship lending due to differences in banks’
activity levels, which should be reflecting their liquidity demands and balance-sheet sizes.
We apply the proposed identification framework to the data on over one million interbank
transactions conducted in the Italian interbank market (e-MID) during 2000–2015. The results
reveal important facts about relationship lending, some of which can be summarized as follows.
First, throughout the data period, the percentage of relationship lending among all bilateral
transactions has been stable, although the percentage slightly increased around the occurrence
of particular economic events (e.g., circulation of Euro started in 2002 and the Lehman collapse
in 2008). Second, significant ties tend to last for longer periods than non-significant ties
do, which is consistent with the conventional notion of relationship lending. Interestingly,
the duration of relationships has a decreasing hazard rate (i.e., the probability of ending a
relationship is decreasing in duration). This implies that the value of relationships in the
interbank market increases in time, contrary to the finding of Ongena and Smith (2001) on
bank–firm relationships. Third, the interest rates for relationship lending are indistinguishable
from those for transactional lending before and after the global financial crisis, but in the midst
of the crisis the borrowers of relationship lending paid significantly higher interest rates than
the average. This suggests that some banks faced a hold-up problem at the time of financial
distress. Fourth, the chance that a bank pair is connected by a significant tie is affected little by
the nationality of the banks, suggesting the absence of home-country bias in building bilateral
relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review related studies
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and explain about the data on overnight interbank transactions. The method for identifying
relationship lending is described in section 3, and the results are shown in section 4. Section
5 provides a robustness analysis and some extensions, and section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Literature review
A large fraction of previous works on relationship lending study bilateral relationships between
a bank and a non-financial firm (Sette and Gobbi, 2015; Kysucky and Norden, 2015), while
other studies explored the role of relationship lending in the interbank market (Furfine, 1999;
Cocco et al., 2009; Affinito, 2012; Craig et al., 2015; Hatzopoulos et al., 2015; Bra¨uning and
Fecht, 2017). For example, Cocco et al. (2009) showed that in the Portuguese interbank market,
bilateral trades made by banks with stronger relationships tend to exhibit lower interest rates.
In Italy, Affinito (2012) found that relationship lenders played an essential role as liquidity
providers, especially in the midst of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Bra¨uning and Fecht
(2017) argued that during the financial crisis, relationship lenders in Germany offered lower
interest rates to their close partners. Hatzopoulos et al. (2015) proposed a null model based
on a hypergeometric distribution for testing the significance of edges in the e-MID market.
In the literature, measuring the influence of Lehman bankruptcy on the interbank market
has been one of the central interests. Afonso et al. (2011) argue that counter party risk became
more important than liquidity hoarding at the time of Lehman Brothers’ collapse, showing that
loan terms got more sensitive to borrowers’ credit worthiness. Angelini et al. (2011) also show
that the risk of moral hazard due to “too-big-to-fail” increased during the crisis compared to
the period prior to August 2007.
The e-MID market has also been extensively studied from a point of view of complex net-
works. Iori et al. (2008), Finger et al. (2013) and Fricke and Lux (2015) analyzed the topology
of aggregated interbank networks, while Barucca and Lillo (2016) and focused on the time-
varying nature of interbank networks. Kobayashi and Takaguchi (2017) find several temporal
patterns in bilateral transactions that are similar to the ones observed in social communication
patterns of humans (Cattuto et al., 2010). Examples of studies of other interbank markets
include Craig and Von Peter (2014) for Germany, Giraitis et al. (2016) for the UK, Cont et al.
(2013) for Brazil, and Imakubo and Soejima (2010) for Japan.
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Figure 1: Evolution of interbank networks. Solid and dotted denote the number of active banks N (left axis) and
the number of edges E (right axis) of a daily network, respectively. The largest (November 23, 2000), a middle-sized
(October 29, 2008) and the smallest networks (August 15, 2013) are visualized.
2.2 Data
We use time-stamped data on interbank transactions conducted in the Italian online interbank
market (e-MID) between September 2000 and December 2015. As in the other interbank
markets, e-MID plays a role as a marketplace in which banks in need of short-term liquidity or
having excess liquidities find counterparties by posting an order on the platform. Banks that
post requests are called quoters, and their counterparties are called aggressors. The actual
names of trading banks are not revealed in the platform, but their proper IDs, including their
nationality, are made public (e.g., “IT0002”, where “IT” denotes Italy). The transactions
data contain the following information: date and time (e.g., “2000-09-04 09:12:40”), the
IDs of banks, maturity, interest rates, and trade amount (in million Euros). The e-MID data is
commercially available from e-MID SIM S.p.A based in Milan, Italy (http://www.e-mid.it/).
In this work, we use the overnight transactions of unsecured Euro deposits labeled as
“ON” (i.e., overnight) or “ONL” (i.e., overnight large, namely overnight transactions no less
than 100 million Euros), which comprise the great majority of transactions (> 86%) in the
e-MID market. An advantage of focusing on overnight trades is that we can construct a
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the daily interbank networks. Symbol x denotes the average of variable x over the
corresponding period, and 〈k〉 is the daily average degree. Subscripts “max” and “min” represent the maximum and
minimum values, respectively.
All 2000–2006 2007–2009 2010–2015
# days 3,922 1,618 767 1,537
N 95.80 130.40 101.67 56.45
Nmax 161 161 144 89
Nmin 13 56 48 13
E 262.96 402.16 266.00 114.91
Emax 662 662 461 265
Emin 15 122 76 15
〈k〉 2.54 3.07 2.57 1.97
sequence of snapshots of daily interbank networks having banks as nodes and lending-borrowing
relationships as edges (Fig. 1). An edge is created when a loan is executed. If there are
multiple transactions between two banks during a day, we represent the trading relationship
as one unweighted edge. As a result, the number of edges over the whole data period totals
1,033,349.
From Fig. 1, it is evident that interbank networks constantly change their size on a daily
basis, and there is a common downward trend in the numbers of active banks N and edges E.
Here, “active” banks in a daily network are defined as banks that had transactions at least once
between 9:00 and 18:00. Downward spikes in N and E are mostly due to national holidays in
Italy.1 On the other hand, the presence of a long-term downward trend could be attributed to
multiple factors such as the onset of the global financial crisis, the Greek sovereign debt crisis,
and the introduction of highly expansionary monetary policies of the the European Central
Bank (ECB) (and possibly other central banks). Summary statistics of the time series of daily
interbank networks are presented in Table 1.
1Weekends are not included since the market is closed.
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3 Model and methods
3.1 Fitness model
As a baseline framework for the subsequent statistical analysis, we introduce here a simple
model of daily interbank networks that describes how a lender and a borrower are matched.
Our model is a variant of the fitness model (Caldarelli et al., 2002; De Masi et al., 2006). The
fitness model has been frequently used in the field of network science to explain the mechanism
of dynamic network formation, in which the probability that two agents are connected depends
on the fitness of the agents. In the context of interbank markets, fitness corresponds to the
intrinsic activity level of a bank, such as the demand for short-term liquidity if the bank is a
possible borrower and the willingness to supply funds if the bank is a possible lender. In spite
of its simplicity, the fitness model has been shown to explain many rich properties that emerge
from the evolution of interbank networks (De Masi et al., 2006; Kobayashi and Takaguchi,
2017).
In the baseline model, we regard daily interbank networks as undirected (i.e., we ignore
the direction of edges) because our main focus is on identifying and analyzing the role of
the bilateral relationship between banks. We will extend the analysis to directed networks in
section 5.4. We assume that the probability u that bank i trades with bank j on a given day
is expressed by the product of their activity levels:
u(ai, aj) ≡ aiaj , (1)
where ai > 0 represents the activity level (or fitness) of bank i.
2 The model nests a wide
variety of well-known network generating models, depending on the specification of {ai}. For
example, if ai = a ∀ i, then the model is equivalent to an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with
constant matching probability u = a2 (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, 1959). If ai = ki/
√
2M , where ki
and M are the degree of bank i and the total number of edges in a daily network, respec-
tively, then the matching probability is given by u = kikj/(2M), resulting in the configuration
model (Newman, 2010).3
2In Kobayashi and Takaguchi (2017), we used a matching function of the form u(ai, aj) = (aiaj)
α. In the current
model, we can set α = 1 without loss of generality because the case of α 6= 1 can be recovered by redefining the
activity parameter as aα.
3The configuration model is a network model that generates a random network having a predefined degree sequence
{ki}. See Newman (2010) for details.
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We first estimate the activity vector a ≡ (a1, . . . , aN ), assuming that every element of a
is constant during an aggregate period consisting of τ consecutive business days. In other
words, daily networks in an aggregate period are regarded as independent realizations from
the fitness model with estimated a. In section 5.3, we will consider the case of time-varying
activity parameters. In short, we are extracting a N × 1 vector of bank activity levels from
the observed network structure containing N × (N − 1) elements of information on bilateral
trades (i.e., adjacency matrix). This dimensionality reduction obviously discards the structural
information of a network. In return, the resultant estimates enable us to infer the extent
to which a random matching between banks can explain the empirical network structure,
avoiding an over-identification problem. Based on the estimates of a, we identify the existence
of relationship lending by testing whether the observed number of transactions between two
banks is significantly larger than the value expected by the null hypothesis (i.e., the fitness
model).
3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of activity levels
We split the daily data set into aggregate periods, each consisting of τ business days, and
perform a maximum likelihood estimation of a period by period. Aggregate periods are indexed
by t′ = 1, . . . , t′max, where t′max ≡ btmax/τc and tmax denotes the total number of business days
in the data. For the sake of simplicity, we omit subscript t′ in the rest of this section.
If trading pairs are independently matched each day according to probability u(a, a′), then
the number of trades between banks i and j conducted over τ business days follows a binomial
distribution with parameters τ and u(ai, aj). For a given activity vector a, the joint probability
function of the number of trades in an aggregate period then leads to
p({mij}|a) =
∏
i,j:i 6=j
 τ
mij
u(ai, aj)mij (1− u(ai, aj))τ−mij , (2)
where mij ≤ τ denotes the number of trades (i.e., edges) between i and j observed in an
aggregate period. The log-likelihood function is thus given by
L(a) = log p({mij}|a)
=
∑
i,j:i 6=j
[mij log (aiaj) + (τ −mij) log (1− (aiaj))] + const., (3)
where “const.” denotes the terms that are independent of a. Let N denote the number
of active banks that have at least one transaction during a given aggregate period. The
8
maximum-likelihood estimate of a is the solution for the following N equations:
Hi(a
∗) ≡
∑
j:j 6=i
mij − τ(a∗i a∗j )
1− (a∗i a∗j )
= 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
The first-order condition (4) is obtained by differentiating the log-likelihood function Eq. (3)
with respect to ai. The system of nonlinear equations, H(a) = 0, can be solved by using a
standard numerical algorithm.4 Hereafter, the computed solution (i.e., the maximum likelihood
estimate) of a is denoted by a∗ ≡ (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ). By repeating this process period by period,
we obtain the estimates of activity vectors
{
a∗1,a∗2, . . . ,a∗t′max
}
.
3.3 Statistical tests for relationship lending
Here we present two sorts of statistical tests; one is for identifying bank pairs engaging in
relationship lending and the other is for detecting relationship-dependent banks. In the same
manner as we estimate the activity levels of banks (section 3.2), we split the daily data set
into t′max aggregate periods and implement the tests period by period.
3.3.1 Edge-based test for relationship lending
If bank i has no preference for trading partners and thereby finds a partner in a random
manner as suggested in the fitness model, then the number of bilateral transactions between
banks i and j during a given period, mij , should obey the following binomial distribution:
g(mij |a∗i , a∗j ) =
 τ
mij
u(a∗i , a∗j )mij (1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ−mij , ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N. (5)
In contrast, if bank i has a strong (i.e., non-random) partnership with bank j, then the
distribution of mij will deviate from a binomial distribution. Let m
c
ij denote the c-th per-
centile (0 ≤ c ≤ 100) of g(mij |a∗i , a∗j ) (i.e., c/100 = G(mcij |a∗i , a∗j )), where G is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of g(mij |a∗i , a∗j ). If mij > mcij for a c value close to 100, then the
empirical number of transactions is too large to be explained by random chance, indicating
4We solved the problem by using the Matlab function fsolve, which is based on a modified Newton method,
called the trust-region-dogleg method. The initial values of a are given by the configuration model, ai =∑
j:j 6=i(mij/τ)/
√
2
∑
i<jmij/τ , where the numerator and the denominator represent the daily means of bank i’s
degree and the doubled number of total edges, respectively. There are a few cases in which the estimated activity
values ai and aj indicate u(ai, aj) > 1. In such cases, we assume u = 1.
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Figure 2: Schematic of a significant tie. For illustrative purposes we set τ = 3. The size of circle represents the
activity level of a bank. If banks are matched randomly according to the fitness model, then banks with higher
activity levels will receive larger number of edges on average. If the number of trades between bank i and bank j is
too large to be explained by random chance, then the two banks are considered to be connected by a significant tie
and engaging in relationship lending.
the presence of relationship lending. We call this test the edge-based test since this is a test
for the significance of edges in interbank networks. If mij > m
c
ij , then we say that banks i and
j are connected by a significant tie and engaging in relationship lending. We set c = 99 (i.e.,
99% significance level) throughout the paper. A schematic of a significant tie is presented in
Fig. 2.
Importantly, the number of bilateral trades in a given period itself does not necessarily
indicate the presence of a significant tie. Under a random matching (the upper row of Fig. 2),
bank i trades twice with each of the two counterparties having the largest activity levels, which
should be a natural consequence given the high matching probabilities. By contrast, banks i
and j trade three times in the bottom row of Fig. 2, which is unexpected based on their small
activity levels. Therefore, bank i is considered to engage in relationship lending with bank j
but not with the other three.
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3.3.2 Node-based test for relationship-dependent banks
Since we have random matching probabilities u(a, a′) for any pairs of banks, we can also test
the extent to which a bank depends on a limited number of partners. The probability function
of aggregate degree Ki is given as
f(Ki|a∗) =
∑
{Aij}
∏
j:j 6=i
g(mij = 0)
1−Aij (1− g(mij = 0))Aij × δ
∑
j
Aij ,Ki

=
∑
{Aij}
∏
j:j 6=i
(1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ(1−Aij)(1− (1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ )Aij × δ
∑
j
Aij ,Ki
 , (6)
where Aij is the (i, j)-element of the aggregate adjacency matrix; Aij = 1 if there is at least
one transaction between banks i and j during an aggregate period, and Aij = 0 otherwise.
δ(x, y) denotes the Kronecker delta which equals one if x = y and zero otherwise. Note that the
second equality follows from relation g(mij = 0) = (1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ (Eq. (5)). In fact, Eq. (6)
is equivalent to the distribution of the sum of N − 1 random variables drawn from a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter {1 − (1 − u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ}j:j 6=i, or a Poisson binomial distribution.
Here we would like to compute the CDF of f(Ki|a∗) to evaluate the significance of empirical
Ki. However, exact calculation of the CDF of a Poisson binomial distribution is notoriously
difficult because one must compute
(
N
Ki
)
number of terms (Steele, 1994). Thus, we instead
approximate the probability distribution of Ki to a Poisson distribution (Le Cam, 1960):
f(Ki|a∗) ≈ λ
∗Ki
i e
−λ∗i
Ki!
≡ f˜(Ki|a∗), (7)
where λ∗i ≡
∑
j:j 6=i[1 − (1 − u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ ]. An error bound for this Poisson approximation
is provided by an extended version of the Le Cam’s theorem (Le Cam, 1960; Barbour and
Eagleson, 1983; Steele, 1994):
∞∑
Ki=0
∣∣∣∣∣f(Ki|a∗)− λ∗Kii e−λ
∗
i
Ki!
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2(1− e−λ
∗
i )
λ∗i
∑
j:j 6=i
p2ij , ∀ i, j, (8)
where pij ≡ 1− (1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ .
The Poisson approximation enables us to formally test the null hypothesis that the empirical
aggregate degree Ki is explained by random chance. Let K
c′
i denote the c
′-th percentile
(0 ≤ c′ ≤ 100) of f˜(Ki|a∗). In other words, c′/100 = F˜ (Ki|a∗), where F˜ (Ki|a∗) is the CDF of
f˜(Ki|a∗). If the data reveal that Ki < Kc′i for c′ close to zero, then bank i has a significantly
smaller number of trading partners than random chance would suggest. If this is the case,
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it indicates a significant dependence of bank i on relationship lending. Hereafter we call this
type of test the node-based test, and we set c′ = 1.
3.4 Selection of aggregate length τ
Before applying the model and statistical tests described in the previous sections to empirical
data, we must determine parameter τ , the length of an aggregate period. In fact, varying τ
would cause trade-offs between approximation accuracy and the stability of aggregated data.
On the one hand, the choice of τ would directly affect the accuracy of the Poisson approxima-
tion through its influence on λ∗i and pij in Eq. (8). The average error bound (Eq. (8)) increases
with τ as limτ→∞ pij = 1,∀ i, j (Fig. S1a in Supplementary Information). Taking into account
this positive relationship between the error bound and τ , τ should be set as small as possible.
On the other hand, employing a smaller value of τ would also affect the stability of statistical
results as the aggregate networks could become more unstable because the number of active
banks would change drastically period to period (see Fig. 1). This necessarily reduces the
stability of the data to be examined. Figure S1b illustrates that the average and the standard
deviation of the absolute changes in N , denoted by ∆Nt′ ≡ |Nt′ − Nt′−1| (t′ = 2, . . . , t′max),
take minimum values around τ = 12. Judging from these observations, we employ τ = 10 as a
benchmark value. We will show that all the qualitative results shown in this paper are quite
robust and not sensitive to the choice of τ .
4 Results
4.1 Estimation results: Activity level
The distribution of the estimated activity levels, a∗, is shown in Fig. 3. The distribution has
been relatively stable throughout the data period. Based on these estimates, we can infer
how many transactions would be conducted under the null hypothesis in which the matching
probability is given by u(a∗i , a
∗
j ) ∀ i, j. The empirical number of transactions in an aggregate
period, denoted by M , is given as
M =
∑
i<j
mij . (9)
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Figure 3: Maximum-likelihood estimates of activity. Solid line represents median, and lower and upper dotted lines
respectively denote the 5th and 95th percentiles of the estimated activity distribution in each aggregate period.
The expected number of transactions under the null hypothesis M∗ is given as
M∗ = τ
∑
i<j
u(a∗i , a
∗
j ). (10)
Figure 4a illustrates the relationships between N and M in the empirical data and the esti-
mated model. The almost perfect fit between the estimated values of M∗ and the empirical
data indicates that the maximum likelihood estimation works fairly well; the estimated ac-
tivity accurately captures the actual bank activity in terms of the total number of trades.
In Kobayashi and Takaguchi (2017), we showed that there is a clear superlinear relationship
between the numbers of banks and edges at the daily scale (i.e., τ = 1) using the same data.
Figure 4a in fact reveals that a similar scaling relation arises even at the aggregate level of
τ = 10 business days.
On the other hand, if we take the presence of relationship lending as a given, the empirical
numbers of trading partners should be smaller than the estimated values under the null hy-
pothesis. To see this, Fig. 4b shows the average of aggregate degree K, the number of unique
trading partners in an aggregate period:
K =
1
N
∑
i,j
Aij . (11)
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Figure 4: Comparison between the model and the empirical values of M and K. Each dot corresponds to an aggregate
period. (a) The total number of edges predicted by the model (Eq. (10)) well fits the empirical data. (b) The number
of unique partners predicted by the model (Eq. (12)) overestimates the empirical data.
Under the null hypothesis, the average aggregate degree is computed as
K∗ =
1
N
∑
i,j
[1− (1− u(a∗i , a∗j ))τ ]. (12)
As shown in Fig. 4b, K∗ overestimates K, meaning that in the real world banks tend to be
more selective than a random matching would suggest. In the next section, we identify the
presence of relationship lending by statistically testing the extent of deviation from the null
model.
4.2 Identification results: Significant ties and relationship-dependent
banks
Figures 5a and 5c, respectively, show the number and the fraction of significant ties identified
by the edge-based test. We also checked the robustness of the results to different choices of
τ in SI (Fig. S2). Overall, while the number of significant ties has been decreasing along
with the downward trend of E (see Fig. 1), the percentage of significant ties among all ties is
relatively constant for a given level of statistical significance. However, we see that the fraction
of significant ties apparently went up at the beginning of 2002, when the circulation of Italian
lira officially ended, and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008.
Figures 5b and 5d show the number and share of relationship-dependent banks identified by
the node-based tests, respectively. As in the case of significant ties, the share of relationship-
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Figure 5: Statistical identification of relationship lending. The numbers of (a) significant ties and (b) relationship-
dependent nodes. The fraction of (c) significant ties and (d) relationship-dependent nodes. α ≡ 1 − c/100 denotes
the significance level. “Bonferroni” (pale-red line) denotes the Bonferroni correction for multiple statistical tests.
dependent banks increased drastically at the beginning of 2002 and after the failure of Lehman
Brothers. We note that the results of the node-based tests should be treated with care; the
fraction of relationship-dependent banks increases with τ while the fraction of significant ties
is almost unaffected (Fig. S2). A possible reason for this dependence on τ is a deterioration
in the accuracy of the Poisson approximation (Eq. (8)) as described in section 3.4. Although
the absolute values of the fraction of relationship-dependent banks vary with τ , the relative
trends over the data period appear still similar.
As we saw in Fig. 5, the proposed methods (section 3.3) allow us to statistically identify
bank pairs engaging in relationship lending and relationship-dependent banks. It is worth
noting that this would not be possible without an appropriate null model, which was missing
in previous studies (see section 4.5 for an evaluation of the previous measures for the strength
of relationship lending).
Information regarding banks’ country IDs enables us to investigate the correlations between
banks’ nationality and the existence of a significant tie and between nationality and the chance
of being a relationship-dependent bank. Since Italian banks occupy a great majority in the
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Figure 6: Fraction of (a) Italian-Italian, (b) Italian-foreign, and (c) foreign-foreign bank pairs. Solid and dotted
lines indicate the fractions of the corresponding pairs among all pairs and among relationship pairs, respectively. (d)
Fraction of Italian banks among all banks (solid) and among relationship-dependent banks (dotted). 99% significance
level.
e-MID market, we split all ties into three combinations of nationalities: Italian-Italian, Italian-
foreign, and foreign-foreign pairs.5
As shown in Fig. 6, the fraction of Italian-Italian pairs among all pairs was close to one
in the early 2000s, yet it considerably decreased toward the onset of the global financial crisis
in 2007–2008. At the same time, Italian-foreign and foreign-foreign pairs started to increase
their presence over the pre-crisis period. The fraction of Italian-Italian pairs began to increase
again shortly after the financial crisis occurred, gradually returning to its pre-crisis level. This
seems to suggest that an Italian bank tends to trade with other Italian banks when the market
is under stress. However, the share of Italian-Italian significant ties among all significant ties
moved in sync with the fraction of Italian-Italian pairs among all pairs, suggesting the absence
of home-country bias in creating significant ties. Somewhat counterintuitively, Italian-Italian
pairs are less likely to form significant ties compared to Italian-foreign and foreign-foreign
5The list of all countries is as follows (the number of banks is in parenthesis): Austria (2), Belgium (6), Switzerland
(6), Germany (23), Denmark (1), Spain (7), Finland (1), France (10), Great Britain (14), Greece (6), Ireland (5),
Italy (213), Luxembourg (4), Holland (4), Norway (1), Poland (1), and Portugal (4).
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Figure 7: Visualization of aggregate networks. In the upper and middle rows, red and black circles represent
Italian and foreign banks, respectively. In the bottom row, relationship-dependent banks are denoted by blue circles.
The visualization is done by igraph package for Python (http://igraph.org/python/), using the Kamada-Kawai
algorithm (Kamada and Kawai, 1989).
pairs. When it comes to the fraction of relationship-dependent banks (Fig. 6d), the trend over
the data period is similar to that of the fraction of Italian-Italian pairs (Fig. 6a). In particular,
the percentage of Italian banks among all relationship-dependent banks is no less than 80%
throughout the data period. The deviation between the two lines in Fig. 6d suggests that the
probability of becoming a relationship-dependent bank has been higher for Italian banks than
for non-Italian banks at least until around 2012.
Figure 7 presents a visualization of networks observed in different aggregate periods. In
the early 2000s, there is no clear cut of groups since most active banks are Italian and they
are well connected to each other. We observe a similar situation when we construct a network
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of significant ties only. By contrast, in a period shortly before the financial crisis, apparently
there exist two tightly connected groups of banks, one formed by Italian banks and the other
by foreign banks. This observation is explained by the result shown in Fig. 6; the fraction of
foreign-foreign pairs reached its peak in 2007 while the fraction of Italian-foreign ties began to
decrease in 2006. The two groups can be seen more clearly if we leave significant ties only since
just a few significant ties connect Italian and foreign banks in this period. In 2014, the network
looks similar to that in 2001, but the numbers of active banks and edges are much smaller in
2014 than in 2001. In addition, the share of relationship-dependent foreign banks is relatively
larger in the period during the crisis than in the pre- and post-crisis periods, although the vast
majority of relationship-dependent banks are still Italian banks.
4.3 Role of relationship lending
The previous sections confirmed the existence of significant ties in the empirical data. In this
section, we explore the difference in the outcomes of significant and non-significant ties in
terms of their duration, trading conditions, and structural characteristics.
4.3.1 Duration and the value of partnership
If relationship lending is understood as a long-lasting relationship between banks, the duration
of significant ties should be longer than that of non-significant ties. Here, the duration of a
(non-)significant tie between two banks is defined as the length of consecutive periods in each of
which these banks form a (non-)significant tie between them. In fact, the duration distribution
of significant ties has a fatter tail than that of non-significant ties (Fig. 8). The duration
distribution of significant ties has a long tail and follows a power law at least in the pre-crisis
period (2000–2006). This fat-tail behavior indicates that the longer the duration length, the
more likely the current partnership will continue (i.e., the hazard rate is decreasing). To see
this, let P (d) = 1− (κ/γ)d−γ (κ > 0) be a continuous approximation of the CDF of duration
length d. The hazard rate λ, or the probability that a bank pair terminates their d−period
relationship, leads to
λ(d) =
p(d)
1− P (d) =
γ
d
, (13)
where p(d) is the probability density function of d. It follows that during the pre-crisis period,
the hazard rate at duration length d is given by λ(d) ≈ 2.17 d−1.
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Figure 8: Duration of a lending relationship. (a)–(c): triangle (circle) denotes the complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) of the length of consecutive periods in each of which a bank pair is connected by
a significant tie (a non-significant tie). In panel (a), the slope of the CCDF is also shown (black solid), which is
estimated by the maximum-likelihood method proposed by Clauset et al. (2009). (d)–(f): histogram of the total
number of periods in which a bank pair is connected by a significant tie or a non-significant tie.
The decreasing hazard contrasts with the previous result for bank–firm relationships shown
by Ongena and Smith (2001). They found that the probability of terminating a relationship
increases in duration, arguing that the value of relationships decreases over time. Our re-
sult indicates that the opposite holds true for the interbank market; the value of interbank
relationships may increase over time. This is consistent with the traditional theory of relation-
ship lending that supports the benefit of a long-term relationship (Freixas and Rochet, 2008),
suggesting that the longer the duration of a partnership, the greater the extent of private
information owned by a lender (Sharpe, 1990).
One might argue that the long duration of significant ties simply comes from the fact that
relationship pairs tend to trade more frequently than non-relationship pairs do. However,
Fig. 8d–f reveals that the number of periods in which non-relationship pairs trade is larger
than that of relationship pairs. Thus, the long duration of a significant tie is not attributed to
the high frequency of the pair’s trades.
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Figure 9: Impact of relationship lending on (a) interest rates and (b) trade amount. Solid line and shading indicate
the average and the 95% confidence interval, respectively. In each panel, the difference is calculated by subtracting
the values for non-significant ties from those for significant ties.
4.3.2 Terms of trades and the substitutability of trading partners
In this section, we analyze the impact that the presence of a significant tie has on trade
conditions (i.e., interest rates and the amount of loans). To control for the influences of shifts
in the policy rate and variations in the trading volume, we define the weighted average of
detrended interest rates on bilateral transactions between banks i and j as
rt′,ij ≡
∑
t∈Dt′ (r
raw
t,ij − 〈rt〉)wt,ij∑
t∈Dt′ wt,ij
, (14)
where
〈rt〉 ≡
∑
i<j r
raw
t,ij wt,ij∑
i<j wt,ij
, (15)
and rrawt,ij is the raw interest rate. wt,ij is the total volume of funds traded between banks i
and j on day t. Set Dt′ represents the set of dates t that belong to aggregate period t
′. The
average amount of loans per trade between banks i and j is defined as
W t′,ij ≡
∑
t∈Dt′
wt,ij
mt′,ij
, (16)
where mt′,ij denotes the total number of trades between banks i and j during period t
′.
Figure 9 shows the differences in rt′,ij and W t′,ij between significant ties and non-significant
ties, calculated by subtracting the values for non-significant ties from those for significant ties.
The weighted interest rates are higher for relationship trades than for transactional trades
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by around three to six basis points during the global financial crisis. This fact implies the
presence of imperfect substitutability of trading partners and that relationship lending played
an important role in the management of liquidity (Affinito, 2012).6 In interbank markets, it
is occasionally observed that banks trying to meet urgent liquidity needs accept high interest
rates to avoid stigma even if they can borrow from the central bank at lower rates (Ashcraft
et al., 2011; Ennis and Weinberg, 2013). The result shown in Fig. 9a implies that those banks
that played a role as “lenders of last resort” were connected with their borrowers by significant
ties.
The upward spike in the difference in interest rates observed around January 2012 is con-
sidered to be caused by a “longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO)” introduced by the ECB.
As pointed out by Barucca and Lillo (2018), the introduction of LTRO suddenly reduced the
number of active banks and the volume of loans in the e-MID market. The decrease in the
number of active banks might have undermined the substitutability of trading partners by
limiting the number of potential partners, leading to an increase in the price of loans for
relationship-dependent banks.
4.4 Extension
Here, we provide two extended analyses of significant ties. One is the analysis of a trading
relationship among multiple banks. Since we can identify the significance of relationships
between any combination of two banks, it is possible to investigate how likely a structure of
direct transactions involving multiple banks connected by significant ties, such as a triangle,
will emerge. Another extension considered here is the application of the identification of
significant and non-significant ties to characterize the intraday behavior of banks.
4.4.1 Relationship among multiple banks
In the literature of social network analysis, it has been widely recognized that there is a
tendency that “friends of friends are friends” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This is called
a triadic closure since the two individuals having a friend in common often close the trian-
gle (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). Many studies have revealed that triadic closure plays an
important role in achieving social cooperation (Hanaki et al., 2007), determining the spread of
6A price discrimination could occur if the maturity structures were different between relationship and transactional
trades, but in this work we focus only on overnight transactions.
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Figure 10: Trilateral relationship and significant ties. (a) Schematic of the probability Pnonsig ≡ T2/(T2 + T3) that
a triangle having two significant ties has a non-significant closing tie. Solid edges labeled “sig” represent significant
ties while dotted lines denote non-significant ties. (b) Time series of Pnonsig and the fraction of {T`}`=0,1,2,3 among
all triangles.
a behavior across ties (Centola, 2010), and understanding the long-term evolution of network
structure (Lewis et al., 2012), to name a few. Analogously, the purpose of this section is to see
whether triadic closures are also ubiquitous in the “friendship” network of banks. To be more
precise, the question we address here is whether a significant tie is more likely to close a tri-
angle of trading relationships (i.e., trilateral relationship) than a non-significant tie, provided
that the triangle has at least two significant ties. This question is motivated by the well-known
fact that triangles in social networks are mostly made of three strong ties (Granovetter, 1973;
Onnela et al., 2007; Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). If a significant tie is more likely to close a
triangle, it would indicate a previously unknown similarity between financial and social net-
works. In contrast, if a non-significant tie is more likely to close a triangle, then it would shed
light on a unique characteristic of financial networks.
To answer this question, we first need to count the numbers of triangles in the aggregate
networks having different numbers of significant ties (see Appendix for the procedure of cal-
culation). Let T` denote the number of triangles having ` significant ties (` = 0, 1, 2, 3) in an
aggregate network. The quantity we want to compute is schematically visualized in Fig. 10a;
if Pnonsig ≡ T2/(T2 + T3) is significantly larger than the fraction of non-significant ties in the
whole network (i.e., the probability of placing a non-significant tie by chance), then the closing
tie of a trilateral relationship is more likely to be a non-significant tie than random chance
would suggest. Since the percentage of significant ties is roughly 20%–30% throughout the data
period (Fig. 5), the fraction of non-significant ties, denoted by Snonsig ≡ |Inonsig|/
∑
i<j Aij ,
where Inonsig is the set of non-significant ties, turns out to be around 0.7− 0.8, which becomes
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the baseline for evaluating Pnonsig.
Figure 10b shows that Pnonsig is always above 0.9 except for a few aggregate periods,
meaning that a trilateral relationship having at least two significant ties tends to have a non-
significant tie as the closing tie. This observation is statistically verified by the t-test for the
null hypothesis that the means of Pnonsig and Snonsig are equal, which is rejected with p-value
< 0.001. Figure 10b also illustrates the time series of {T`}`=0,1,2,3 normalized by T , the total
number of triangles in each period. The order T0 > T1 > T2 > T3 consistently holds true
throughout the data period. In addition, we see some trends in their relative shares; the share
of T0 and T1 roughly move in opposite directions while the shares of T2 and T3 remain stable.
The result suggests that the local dynamics of tie formation in financial networks is quite
different from that in social networks. While triangles of three strong ties are ubiquitous in
networks formed by human interactions, interbank networks do not exhibit such a property.
4.4.2 Intraday analysis
In the previous sections, we observed that bank pairs connected by significant ties exhibit
different behaviors than other transactional pairs at a τ -day aggregate scale. In this section,
we explore intraday trading patterns to see if the existence of a significant tie has any impact
on trades at higher frequencies.
In Fig. 11, we observe subtle differences in the timing of intraday trading. A bank pair
engaging in relationship lending tends to conduct a larger fraction of trades at early hours
(9:00–11:00) and a smaller fraction of trades after 15:00 than a bank pair engaging in trans-
actional trading (Fig. 11a). This difference in the timing of trades does not seem to have
a considerable impact on interest rates, but late-hour relationship trades resulted in slightly
higher interest rates than those of transactional trades until the crisis period (Fig. 11b).7 Nev-
ertheless, we still see a downward sloping term structure of intraday interest rates, which has
been reported previously (Baglioni and Monticini, 2010, 2008; Abbassi et al., 2017).
It is evident from Fig. 11c that the positive difference in the trade amount between rela-
tionship and transactional lending tends to get larger as the market-closing time approaches.
These gaps in the interest rate and amount of trades may reflect the fact that those banks
that must obtain or release liquidity at the end of the market tend to rely on their partners
to which they are connected by significant ties.
7The interest rate on the trade between banks i and j at time θ on day t is defined as rθ,t,ij = r
raw
θ,t,ij −〈rt〉, where
the superscript “raw” denotes the raw interest rate (before detrending) and 〈rt〉 is defined in Eq. (15).
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Figure 12: Comparison with the conventional measures of relationship lending. Solid (dashed) line represents the
“accuracy” of LPI (RL), defined by the Jaccard index (Eq. (19)). RL and LPI are given by Eqs. (17) and (18),
respectively.
4.5 Comparison with previous measures
In closing this section, we assess the previously proposed measures of relationship lending by
computing the extent to which they are able to detect significant ties. A naive measure of
lending relationship is the frequency of interactions between two banks (Furfine, 1999; Kysucky
and Norden, 2015; Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2017):
RLij,t′ ≡ log(1 +mij,t′), (17)
which denotes the logarithm of the number of transactions between banks i and j conducted
in an aggregate period t′. The second and more widely used measure is the lender–preference
index (LPI) (Cocco et al., 2009; Affinito, 2012; Craig et al., 2015; Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2017):
LPIij,t′ ≡
∑
t∈Dt′ wij,t∑
j:j 6=i
∑
t∈Dt′ wij,t
. (18)
LPI captures the degree of concentration of lending to a particular partner.8 If the fraction of
funds lent to a particular partner is high, then it would indicate the existence of relationship
lending. These two conventional measures are usually employed as explanatory variables of
linear regression models.
Now let us assess the accuracy of RL and LPI in terms of their detectability of significant
ties. Let Isig denote the set of significant ties identified by our edge-based test, which is
8Note that the amount lent is equal to the amount borrowed in our setting since we only treat undirected networks.
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treated as the “ground truth.” The fraction of significant ties among all ties in a given period
is represented as Ssig ≡ |Isig|/
∑
i<j Aij . For each x = RL,LPI, let Ix be the set of bank
pairs whose score of x is ranked top Ssig% in the corresponding period. If measure x correctly
reflects the strength of a bilateral relationship, then the following Jaccard index will take a
value close to one:
Jx =
|Ix ∩ Isig|
|Ix ∪ Isig| , x = RL,LPI. (19)
Figure 12 reveals that, somewhat surprisingly, RL outperforms LPI, although the definition
of LPI seems more sophisticated than that of RL as a measure of a lending relationship. This
may be due to the fact that the degree of concentration of lending to or borrowing from a
particular bank does not necessarily relate to the number of trades with the bank, whereas
our definition of a significant tie generally favors a bank pair conducting a large number of
trades. RL just reflects the number of bilateral trades regardless of their volume, but it is
closer to our idea of significant ties than LPI is. Of course, just counting the number of trades
is not enough because one must take into account the difference in banks’ activity levels. An
observation of repeated trades between two banks does not necessarily lead to the presence of
a significant tie because such repetitive trades may be explained by random chance if the two
banks exhibit high activity levels. Nevertheless, Fig. 12 shows that RL is far more appropriate
than LPI as a measure of relationship lending, although JRL ∼ 0.6 does not mean that RL is
very accurate.
5 Robustness check
In this section, the robustness of the baseline framework is investigated. We first examine the
power of the proposed test on synthetic core-periphery networks. We also perform edge- and
node-based tests in a more general setting where bank activity is time-varying and/or edges
are directed.
5.1 Monte Carlo analysis with core-periphery structure
We check the power of the proposed test by numerical simulation. To generate a sequence
of synthetic daily networks on which significance tests are based, we employ a core-periphery
structure since it has been shown to be a plausible network structure in various interbank
markets (Imakubo and Soejima, 2010; Craig and Von Peter, 2014; Fricke and Lux, 2015).
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The procedure of the Monte Carlo analysis is as follows:
1. Initially there are N isolated banks. Fraction fc of the banks are designated as core
banks and fraction 1− fc as peripheral banks.
2. On day t, any two core banks are connected with probability pcc, a core bank and a
peripheral bank are connected with pcp, and there is no edge between two peripheral
banks. We generate a sequence of τ snapshots of daily interbank networks, Â(t), Â(t +
1), . . . , Â(t+ τ).
3. Among the pairs that had at least one transaction within τ days, choose a fraction frel
of pairs at random as relationship pairs. For a relationship pair (i, j), assume that the
probability that an additional trade is not imposed at t, denoted by pnorelij (t), depends on
the number of consecutive trading days up to t− 1. The hazard rate is given by
pnorelij (t) =
b0
b1 + b2Dij(t− 1) , (20)
where Dij(t − 1) denotes the number of consecutive transactions between i and j up to
t− 1, and b0, b1 and b2 are non-negative parameters.
4. If Âij(t) = 0, add a relationship edge (i, j) with probability 1−pnorelij (t) for all relationship
pairs (i, j), i 6= j. This gives us the sequence of adjacency matrices with relationship
edges, {Ârel(t)}.
5. Estimate bank activity {ai} using {Ârel(t)} in the same way as described in section 3.2
and implement the edge-based tests.
It should be noted that if there is no relationship edge in the synthetic networks (i.e.,
networks {Â(t)}), then the number of transactions between two banks follows a binomial
distribution since in each day a bilateral edge (i, j) is created with a constant probability
u(ai, aj). By contrast, if two banks are matched in a non-random manner, then the number
of connections no longer obeys a binomial distribution. In the latter case, the presence of
non-random edges should be detected by the proposed tests.
We run simulations 5,000 times with the length of simulation periods 3,000. For significance
tests, only the last τ periods are used and the initial (3000 − τ) periods are discarded. The
parameter values are set as follows: fc = 0.5, ppp = 0.06, pcp = 0.03, b0 = 1 and frel = 0.2.
We check different values of b1 and b2.
Fig. 13 illustrates the density functions of the fraction of detected significant ties. Fig. 13a
corresponds to the case of no relationship lending (i.e., b2 = 0), in which the number of
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Figure 13: Edge test on synthetic networks with core-periphery structure. The true fraction of significant ties is set
at 0.2. α denotes the significance level.
transactions between two banks follows a binomial distribution. We see type-I errors in Fig. 13a
because multiple tests are implemented, but the tests with Bonferroni correction alleviates the
problem. Fig. 13b and c introduce relationship lending into the otherwise random network with
a core-periphery structure. It turns out that the proposed tests are able to detect significant
ties quite accurately as long as there is a certain extent of non-random relationship. Fig. 13d
shows that increasing the length of time window, τ , may improve the accuracy of the tests on
synthetic networks.
5.2 Different time windows
In the baseline framework, we split the whole data period into non-overlapping t′max = btmax/τc
time windows, each of which consisting of τ business days. To check the sensitivity of the results
to the way we split the data, we implement significance tests by using rolling time windows
for different values of τ .
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Fig. S2 presents the results for τ = {5, 10, 20}, in which we progressively slide the start
date of a τ -day time window by one day increments. We see that introducing rolling time win-
dows does not have a quantitative impact on the fractions of significant ties and relationship-
dependent nodes. The figure also indicates that time windows of τ = 5 may be too narrow to
capture banks’ relationship dependency since it gives us much lower fractions of relationship-
dependent banks compared to the cases of τ = 10 and 20. On the other hand, the results for
τ = 10 and 20 are quite similar, which suggests that the choice of τ = 10 would be appropriate
given the fact that an increase in τ also has negative effects on the accuracy of the Poisson
approximation while improving the consistency of maximum-likelihood estimates (Fig. 13).
5.3 Time-varying bank activity
In the baseline null model, we assumed that activity level a is constant within a time interval.
Here, we relax this assumption by allowing a to fluctuate at the daily scale. The matching
probability between banks i and j is given by
u(ai(t), aj(t)) ≡ ai(t)aj(t), ∀ i, j, t, (21)
where ai(t) denotes the activity of bank i on day t. Thus, we need to estimate N × τ activity
parameters, (a(1), . . . ,a(τ)).
5.3.1 Edge-based test
The procedure for the edge-based test based on variable activities is as follows:
1. By imposing τ = 1 in Eq. (4), we obtain the estimates of activities on day t, denoted by
aˆ(t), by solving the following N equations:
Hˆi(aˆ(t)) ≡
∑
j:j 6=i
Aij(t)− aˆi(t)aˆj(t)
1− aˆi(t)aˆj(t) = 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . N, (22)
where Aij(t) denotes the (i, j)th element of a binary adjacency matrix of day t.
9 Under
the null, the total number of transactions between banks i and j in a given time interval,
denoted bymij , obeys a Poisson binomial distribution with mean λˆij ≡
∑τ
t=1 u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t))
and variance σˆij ≡
∑τ
t=1(1− u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t)))u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t)).
9As is shown in Fig. S3, the estimated daily activities fluctuate around the constant activity levels.
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Figure 14: Fractions of significant ties and relationship-dependent banks detected by a null model with variable
activity.
2. Approximate the Poisson binomial distribution of mij by a Poisson distribution:
f(mij |{aˆ(t)}) ≈
λˆ
mij
ij e
−λˆij
mij !
≡ f˜(mij |{aˆ(t)}), (23)
where the error bound is given by the Le Cam’s theorem:
∞∑
mij=0
∣∣∣∣∣f(mij |{aˆ(t)})− λˆ
mij
i e
−λˆij
mij !
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2(1− e−λˆij )λˆij
τ∑
t=1
u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t))
2, ∀ i, j. (24)
3. Implement the edge-based tests by using Eq. (23) as a null distribution.
Fig. 14a shows that the qualitative result does not change even after introducing variable
activity parameters while the detected fraction of significant ties is slightly lower than before.
5.3.2 Node-based test
The only modification for the node-based test is that we now take into account the fact that
the probability of matching between two nodes can change over time. Here, the probability
that bank i has at least one transaction with bank j in a given period is given by 1−∏τt=1(1−
u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t))). Accordingly, aggregate degree Ki (i.e., the number of bank i’s unique trading
partners) follows a Poisson binomial distribution with mean λˆi ≡
∑
j:j 6=i [1−
∏τ
t=1(1− u(aˆi(t), aˆj(t)))].
The distribution of Ki is then approximated by a Poisson distribution:
f(Ki|aˆ) ≈ λˆ
Ki
i e
−λˆi
Ki!
≡ f˜(Ki|aˆ). (25)
Fig. 14b indicates that again the introduction of variable activities does not change the
time-series behavior of the fraction of relationship-dependent banks.
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5.4 Directed edges
Our statistical tests can also incorporate the directionality of edges. Here, we need to consider
two sorts of bank activities: in-activity and out-activity. The random probability that bank i
lends to bank j is now given by
ui→j(aouti , a
in
j ) = a
out
i a
in
j , (26)
where ain and aout denote in- and out-activity, respectively. The maximum-likelihood estimates
of in- and out-activity are the solution for the following 2N equations:
∑
j:j 6=i
mij − τaouti ainj
1− aouti ainj
= 0, (27)
∑
j:j 6=i
mji − τaoutj aini
1− aoutj aini
= 0, (28)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Using the matching probability Eq. (26) as a parameter, we can test the
significance of a directed edge in the same way as explained in section 3.3.1. The depen-
dency of a node on particular creditors (i.e., borrowing dependency) or borrowers (i.e., lending
dependency) can also be tested by implementing a directed version of the node-based test.
It is also straightforward to introduce a daily variations of activity (see section 5.3) into
the directed version of significance tests. The daily in- and out-activity on day t are estimated
by solving the following 2N equations:
∑
j:j 6=i
Aij(t)− aouti (t)ainj (t)
1− aouti (t)ainj (t)
= 0, (29)
∑
j:j 6=i
Aji(t)− aoutj (t)aini (t)
1− aoutj (t)aini (t)
= 0, (30)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then we estimate 2N × τ parameters for each time window.
The directed edge test in fact yields essentially the same result as the one we obtained in
the undirected model (Fig. 15a and d). A reason for this is that there are few pairs that have
bidirectional edges (Kobayashi and Takaguchi, 2017).
On the other hand, we see an interesting property for the directed node-based tests. For
a sufficiently high level of statistical significance, the fraction of borrowing-dependent banks
spiked around the global crisis (Fig. 15c and f) while the fraction of lending-dependent banks
did not (Fig. 15b and e). This strongly suggests that the rise of relationship-dependent banks
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Figure 15: Edge- and node-based tests for directed networks. Upper panels (i.e., a–c) represent the fraction of edges
or banks that passed the tests for directed networks based on constant bank activity (see section 5.4). Lower panels
(i.e., d–f) show the corresponding results for the tests based on variable bank activity (see section 5.3).
in the midst of the global financial crisis, as indicated by the undirected node test, could be
attributed to the increased fraction of borrowing banks that relied on a limited number of
creditors.
6 Conclusion and discussion
This work proposed a statistical test for identifying bank pairs that are engaging in relationship
lending by introducing the concept of a significant tie. The proposed identification test was
applied to the Italian daily interbank networks formed by overnight transactions. The point
of our identification method is that we test whether or not the number of trades between two
banks can be explained by random chance after controlling for the intrinsic activity levels of
those banks. If the number of trades is statistically significant (i.e., cannot be explained by
random chance), then we say that the two banks are connected by a significant tie. We showed
that the percentage of significant ties among all ties has been quite stable over the past years,
while the number of significant ties itself has been declining along with the total number of
trades in the interbank market.
We found several important properties that distinguish relationship lending from other
transactional lending. First, the duration of a significant tie is, on average, longer than that
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of a non-significant tie. This property indicates that the value of continuing a relationship
increases in duration, as suggested by many theoretical studies (Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
Second, in the midst of financial distress, banks in need of liquidity relied on banks to which
they are connected by significant ties even at the cost of high interest rates. This may be
evidence that relationship lenders played a role as the “lender of last resort” during financial
turmoil. Third, there is no home-country bias in creating significant ties.
While we apply the proposed identification method to the Italian interbank market due
simply to data availability, in principle it would also be possible to implement it on various
time-varying networks. Our method is quite general and thereby not limited to the use of
identification of relationship lending in interbank markets. For example, they could also be
applied to trading networks in the corporate bond market (Maggio et al., 2017) and the
municipal bond market (Li and Schurhoff, 2014) in search of a hidden structure of significant
ties between market traders.
The current work also provides a temporal-network analysis of the interbank market, which
is still scarce in the field of network science and in economics, with a few exceptions (Kobayashi
and Takaguchi, 2017; Barucca and Lillo, 2018). Understanding the dynamic formation of inter-
bank networks is quite important because the network structure formed by overnight bilateral
transactions drastically changes day to day, meaning that the risk of financial contagion varies
over time. While most of the studies on financial systemic risk are based on static networks (Gai
and Kapadia, 2010; Cont et al., 2013; Brummitt and Kobayashi, 2015), in the real world the
risk of financial contagion emerges on networks with time-varying structures. We hope that
our work will advance our knowledge about the mechanism of temporal financial networks,
which could contribute to the real-time management of financial stability.
Appendix: Counting the number of triangles
In section 4.4.1, we counted the number of triangles in an aggregate network to investigate the
role of significant ties in a trilateral relationship. Computing the number of triangles having
k significant ties, Tk, is straightforward if we exploit the power of adjacency matrix. First,
the total number of triangles in the whole network is given by T =
∑3
k=0 Tk = tr(A
3)/6,
where tr(·) denotes trace. This equality is based on the fact that the (i, j) element of An
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represents the number of paths from i to j that can be reached at exactly n steps. Therefore,
the diagonal elements of A3 contain the numbers of triangles. Second, the number of triangles
formed by three significant ties is given as T3 = tr(A
3
sig)/6, where Asig is an adjacency matrix
of the network consisting only of significant ties. Third, the number of triangles formed only
by non-signifiant ties leads to T0 = tr((A−Asig)3)/6. Fourth, the number of triangles having
exactly one and two significant ties, T1 and T2, are obtained as follows:
1. Create a “signed” adjacency matrix Asigned, where (Asigned)ij = 1 if i and j are connected
by a significant tie, −1 if connected by a non-significant tie, and 0 otherwise.
2. Compute Tsigned = tr(A
3
signed)/6. This is equal to the difference between the number of
triangles having an odd number of significant ties and the number of triangles having an
even number of significant ties (i.e., Tsigned = (T1 + T3)− (T0 + T2)).
3. Derive T1 and T2 by substituting T , T0, and T3 into equations T =
∑3
k=0 Tk and Tsigned =
(T1 + T3)− (T0 + T2).
This procedure gives us Tk for k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
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Figure S1: Effects of varying aggregate length τ . (a) An increase in τ makes it less accurate the Poisson approximation
of a Poisson binomial distribution. Solid line represents the error bound indicated by the RHS of Eq. (8). Upper and
lower dotted lines denote the maximum and minimum error bounds, respectively. (b) Mean and standard deviation
of absolute changes in N .
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Figure S2: Effects of varying aggregate length τ . Left and right columns present the fraction of significant ties and
the fraction of relationship-dependent banks, respectively. A rolling window is used.
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Figure S3: Comparison between constant and time-varying activity levels of a bank. Bank ID is annotated at the
top of each panel. The three banks are ranked 1st (top), 50th (middle) and 100th (bottom) among 308 banks in
terms of the number of participating days.
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